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COMES NOW, Respondent, Jennifer A. Wilson, now known as Jennifer A. Kinsey, by
and through their attorney of record, Sarah A. McDowell-Lamont, and respectfully submits the
Respondent’s Reply Brief.
I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner/ Appellant, Gary A. Wilson, hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Wilson,” argues in
his Brief of Petitioner that he should prevail in his appeal. Respondent, Jennifer A. Kinsey,
hereinafter to as “Ms. Kinsey,” argues in this Reply that the magistrate court did not error in its
division of property.
th

In the Fall of 2013, Mr. Wilson came across a home for sale at 1110 8 Avenue, Lewiston
Idaho. Mr. Wilson then showed the home to Ms. Kinsey, who was taken with the house. Ms.
Kinsey decided to purchase the home under her name only. Mr. Wilson sought to assist Ms. Kinsey
with the purchase of the home and provided her with just under $35,000.00 for the down payment.
The purchase of the home occurred in January 2, 2014. The lender, Mann Mortgage, insisted that
the Petitioner sign a gift letter, which was admitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 506. The parties were
then married on June 8, 2014. In March 2015, Ms. Kinsey re-financed the home. The quitclaim
deed admitted as Respondent’s Exhibit 502 stated Ms. Kinsey was dealing with her sole and
separate property as a married woman.
Mr. Wilson was employed before and after the marriage with Clearwater Paper Corporation
and had both a 401K Retirement Plan and Pension Plan with that company. Mr. Wilson
subsequently borrowed money from his 401K Retirement Account during the marriage and Ms.
Kinsey incurred student loan debt in the amount of $22,000.00 while the parties were married.
After a court trial on October 17, 2017, the magistrate court ultimately held that Mr.
Wilson’s Clearwater 401K Retirement Account was community property, that the down payment
given by Mr. Wilson to Ms. Kinsey was Ms. Kinsey’s separate property and ordered an unequal
division of property in favor of Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson appealed the decision to the district court,
which affirmed the magistrate decision. Mr. Wilson now appeals the district court’s decision.
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II.
ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Did the magistrate court error in the valuation of Mr. Wilson’s Clearwater 401K
Retirement Account?
B. Did the magistrate court error in finding the $35,000.00 gift from Mr. Wilson to
Ms. Kinsey for the purchase of the property located 1110 8th Avenue, Lewiston,
Idaho was not an asset of the party’s marriage.
C. Is Ms. Kinsey entitled to attorney fees and costs for defending against this
appeal?

III.

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT
A. The magistrate court did not error in the valuation of the Mr. Wilson’s Clearwater
401K Retirement Account as the Petitioner failed to present evidence of its
separate value prior to marriage.
During the court trial, Mr. Wilson failed to provide any exhibits in the form of documentation or
statements to the community and separate property values of his Clearwater 401K Retirement
Account. The only documentation or statements of Mr. Wilson’s retirement account were provided
by Ms. Kinsey as Exhibit 512. (Tr., p. 33-35). It has been well established that property acquired
during the marriage is community property and the party asserting separate property has the burden
by clear and convincing evidence that the property is, in fact, separate. Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho
394, 396, 973 P.2d 746, 748 (1999). While there is no dispute the Clearwater 401K Retirement
Account existed prior to marriage, Mr. Wilson did not present any evidence to its separate value
besides his own testimony that he contributed $128.00 every two (2) weeks to the account during
the marriage. (Tr. p. 39-41). This testimony was vague and asked the court to speculate on the
community and separate values of the account. Thus, the court did not error in characterizing and
valuing the retirement account in the Property Value and Debt Distribution Summary as Mr.
Wilson failed to present evidence of its separate nature.
Secondly, the Idaho Supreme Court applies the abuse of discretion to a magistrate court’s
division of property in a divorce proceeding. Koontz v. Koontz, 101 Idaho 51, 52, 607 P.2d 1325,
1326 (1980). Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate inquiry is multi-tiered:
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any rules applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court made its decision by an exercise of reason.
Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 195, 765 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ct. App. 1988).
Here, the magistrate court appears to have rightly perceived the issue of nature and value
of the Clearwater 401K Retirement Account as a community property asset. As to the standard of
review, the Idaho Supreme Court held that determination of the nature and value of property in a
divorce proceeding are left to the discretion of a magistrate. See Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho
599, 601, 213 P.3d 384, 386 (2009); Worzala v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 411, 913 P.2d 1178, 1181
(1996); and Kawamura v. Kawamura, 159 Idaho 1, 4, 355 P. 3d 630, 633 (2015). Additionally, “a
trial court's findings of fact, which are based upon substantial and competent, although conflicting,
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal; which is to say the findings of fact will not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous.” DeChambeau v. Estate of Smith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d 922, 925
(1999). The magistrate court, in this case, acted within its discretion, and within reason, by holding
that Mr. Wilson’s Clearwater 401K Retirement Account is a community property rather than
separate property. Ms. Kinsey was the only party who provided the value of the account and Mr.
Wilson only gave vague testimony was provided as to his bi-weekly contribution to the account.
(Tr. p. 39-41). Thus, the magistrate court rightly valued the Clearwater 401K Retirement Account
at $47,428.62 because Mr. Wilson did not present the value of the account at the time of marriage
at the court trial, which was easily obtainable by contacting the account’s plan administrator or
offering an account statement produced near the time of the marriage as an exhibit.
Finally, the magistrate court did, in fact, award the Clearwater 401K Retirement Account to
Mr. Wilson in an unequal division of property in his favor. In that unequal division, the court also
considered the $35,000.00 contribution Mr. Wilson made to Ms. Kinsey’s 1110 8th Avenue,
Lewiston, Idaho home in that division, despite the court’s holding that $35,000.00 was Ms.
Kinsey’s separate property due to being acquired prior to marriage and given to her as a gift.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3-7). Thus, the $47,428.62 value of the 401K
Retirement Account and $35,000.00 contribution were both included in the Property Value and
Debt Distribution Summary, leaving a net asset of $21,814.34 to Mr. Wilson and only $12,456.94
to Ms. Kinsey. If the court had valued the 401K Retirement Account at $4,608.00 but did not
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include the $35,000.00 contribution in the above-described Summary, Mr. Wilson would have
received $21,006,29 of debt to Ms. Kinsey’s $22,543.07 of debt. Further, the court held that the
Clearwater 401K Retirement Account was a community debt, which will be paid by Mr. Wilson
back to himself after the divorce, and it also awarded Mr. Wilson the Clearwater Pension Plan,
without assigning it a value, or considering it in the overall division of property. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, p. 6)
Because Mr. Wilson failed to produce evidence to his separate property interest, the
magistrate order ordered an unequal division of property in favor of Mr. Wilson and considered
the 401K debt as a community debt, the court did not abuse its discretion in placing a value of the
401K Retirement Account.
B. The magistrate court did not error in finding the $35,000.00 gift from Mr.
Wilson to Ms. Kinsey for the purchase of the property located 1110 8th
Avenue, Lewiston, Idaho was not an asset of the party’s marriage.
In his Appellant brief, Mr. Wilson claims that the court errored in not awarding him in an
equitable lien upon Ms. Kinsey’s home at 1110 8th Avenue home. Mr. Wilson cites Countrywide
Loans v. Sheets and Bank of America, 160 Idaho 268, 371 P.3d 322 (2016) as authority that he is
entitled to such a lien as Ms. Kinsey received $35,000.00 for the down payment of her home. (Brief
of Appellant. p. 5). Country Wide Loans concerned a wrongly recorded full reconveyance of the
deed of trust. Id. 160 Idaho 268, 371 P.3d at 324-28 (2016). That case is factually dissimilar to this
case at hand where a divorce court determined that property acquired prior to a marriage was
separate property.
Mr. Wilson also argues that the Idaho Supreme Court allows a magistrate court to consider
language beyond the language of a deed or document. In this case, the magistrate court considered
parole evidence and overruled Ms. Kinsey’s objection to Mr. Wilson’s testimony about the events
surrounding the signing of the a quitclaim deed, admitted as Exhibit 502 a warranty deed, admitted
as Exhibit 507, and a gift letter, admitted as Exhibit 506, for the $35,000.00. (Tr. p. 20-26). It is
also clear from the court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Court consider the
testimony of Mr. Wilson who said he looked to purchase real estate, came across the 1110 8th
Avenue property and sought to help Ms. Kinsey to purchase the property with money just under
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$35,000.00. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2- 3). The court further found that Mr.
Wilson did not have the credit to purchase the property, so Ms. Kinsey bought the property in her
name only, but used the $35,000.00 as a down payment. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
p. 2-3).
After considering Mr. Wilson’s testimony, the court found that there was no evidence to
suggest that the gift letter, which was admitted as Exhibit 506, was signed under force, inducement
or undue influence. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 2). The court further found the
language of Exhibit 506 gift letter was unambiguous. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
p. 4). More importantly, the court held the $35,000.00 was received by Ms. Kinsey from Mr.
Wilson prior to the marriage based upon Idaho Code Sections 32- 903 and 32-906, and that it did
not have jurisdiction to make a characterization of the $35,000.00 as the money and house were
not an asset of a divorce. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4).
Idaho Code Section 32-903 provides,
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HUSBAND AND WIFE. All property of either the
husband or the wife owned by him or her before marriage, and that acquired afterward
by either by gift, bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate property, by way of moneys or other
property, shall remain his or her sole and separate property.
Idaho Code Section 32-906 provides,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY — INCOME FROM SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY — CONVEYANCE BETWEEN SPOUSES.
(1) All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community
property. The income, including the rents, issues and profits, of all property, separate or
community, is community property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired
provides or both spouses, by written agreement specifically so providing, declare that all
or specifically designated property and the income, including the rents, issues and profits,
from all or the specifically designated property shall be the separate property of one of
the spouses or the income, including the rents, issues and profits, from all or specifically
designated separate property be the separate property of the spouse to whom the property
belongs. Such property shall be subject to the management of the spouse owning the
property and shall not be liable for the debts of the other member of the community.
(2) Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and
separate estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge
the deed or other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the provisions of section 32912, Idaho Code; provided, however, that the income, including the rents, issues and
profits, from such property shall not be the separate property of the grantee spouse unless
this fact is specifically stated in the instrument of conveyance.
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Further, Idaho Code Section 32-712 provides,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND HOMESTEAD — DISPOSITION. In case of
divorce by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, the community property and the
homestead must be assigned as follows:
1.
The community property must be assigned by the court in such proportions as the
court, from all the facts of the case and the condition of the parties, deems just, with due
consideration of the following factors:
(a)
Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be a substantially
equal division in value, considering debts, between the spouses.
(b)
Factors which may bear upon whether a division shall be equal, or the
manner of division, include, but are not limited to:
(1)
Duration of the marriage;
(2)
Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, that the
court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any such agreement;
(3)
The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, vocational
skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse;
(4)
The needs of each spouse;
(5)
Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
(6)
The present and potential earning capability of each party; and
(7)
Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social security, civil
service, military and railroad retirement benefits. Emphasis Added.
Because the magistrate court characterized the $35,000.00 as separate property, an abuse
of discretion standard is also applied. See Dunagan, 147 Idaho at 601, 213 P.3d at 386 (2009);
Worzala, 128 Idaho at 411, 913 P.2d at 1181, Kawamura, 159 Idaho at 4, 355 P. 3d at 633. Viewed
on that standard, the court did not error in holding that the property was separate property and, thus,
outside the jurisdiction of a divorce court, as Idaho Code Sections 32- 903, 32-906 and 32-712
clearly indicate that separate property belongs to the party who acquired it prior to marriage absent
proof of transmutation. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have both
clearly held that a divorce court’s jurisdiction does not extend to separate property and a court
neither award the separate property of one spouse to another spouse nor compel one spouse to sell
his or her separate property to the other spouse as part of a decree of divorce . Schneider v.
Schneider, 151 Idaho 415, 426, 258 P. 3d 350, 361 (2011), Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026,
1028-29, 712 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Ct. App. 1985). Here, Ms. Kinsey acquired the home and property
at 1100 8th Avenue on January 2, 2014, prior to the parties’ marriage on June 8, 2014, and Mr.
Wilson signed two (2) deeds affirming Ms. Kinsey’s sole interest in the property (Tr. p. 7, 14,
27-30, 48-47). Additionally, here was no evidence offered at trial to show transmutation of the
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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home. The home has always been her separate property and she cannot be forced under Idaho
law

to give

Mr. Wilson an

interest in the

home, even some kind 0f equitable

Finally, the magistrate court held that
in controversy
states,

was

also over $10.000.00.

“Additional cases

when approved by

Rule 5(C)(1) 0f Idaho Court Administrative Rules

be assigned t0 magistrates pursuant t0 Idaho Code Section 1-2210

may include:

amount of damages or value 0f

5(C)(1). Mr.

did not have jurisdiction because the amount

the administrative district judge 0f a judicial district.

assigned to magistrates
the

may

it

lien.

1.

The

additional cases

Civil actions regardless ofthe nature 0fthe action,

Where

the property claimed does not exceed $10,000.” I.C.A.R.

Wilson sought a $35,000.00 equitable

lien for transaction that occurred prior to

marriage. This equitable lien well exceeds $10,000.00 and therefore belongs in district court.
Therefore, the magistrates’ decision

is

Within the boundaries of the Idaho Code, Idaho

Supreme Court Case law, and the Idaho Court Administrative Rules
at

1110

8th

Avenue

C.

are outside

Ms. Kinsey

Ms. Kinsey

is

is

its

as the $35,000.00

and property

jurisdiction.

entitled t0 attorney fees

entitled t0 attorney's fees

and

costs for defending this appeal.

and costs under Idaho Code Sections 12-107, 12-

120 and 12-121, and I.A.R. 35(b)(5), and I.A.R. 41. If Ms. Kinsey prevails in

this appeal, this

Court should award her, her attorney's fees and costs, because Mr. Wilson failed to meet the
appropriate legal standard in this case.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons

set forth

above, Ms. Kinsey respectfully requests that Mr. Wilson’s

appeal be denied, and she be awarded attorney fees.

DATED this

15th day 0f October 2019.
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Digitally signed

by Sarah A.
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Date: 2019.1 0.1 5 14:43:41 -07'00'

Sarah A. McDowell-Lamont
Attorney for Respondent
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